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Abstract
The tax reform proposals by the Dutch government
include several shifts in the tax structure and a cut in
the overall tax burden. This paper argues that these
reform proposals reduce the unemployment rate only
if the gap between wage incomes and unemployment
benefits increases and the overall tax burden drops.
Targeting the tax reduction to the unskilled seems the
most effective way to cut unemployment. However,
such targeted measures raise the marginal tax on other
incomes, thereby harming the quantity and quality of
labor supply.
Samenvatting
De kabinetsvoorstellen in de nota “Belastingen in de
21e eeuw” verminderen alleen de werkloosheid indien
de belastingdruk daalt en het inkomensverschil tus-
sen loon en uitkering wordt vergroot. Het richten van
de belastingverlaging op werkenden aan de onder-
kant van de arbeidsmarkt blijkt daarbij het meest effec-
tief in het bestrijden van de werkloosheid. Dit gaat ech-
ter gepaard met een verhoging van de marginale druk
op de middeninkomens hetgeen ongunstig uitpakt
voor de kwantiteit en de kwalilteit van het arbeids-
aanbod.
The Dutch government recently published a white paper
“Taxes in the 21st century” on the future of the Dutch tax
system. The tax-reform proposals in this white paper
address the challenges the Dutch tax system is likely to
face in the next century. The document suggests reforms
of several taxes, including capital, income, consumption
and environmental taxes. The article by Bovenberg and
Ter Rele in this issue of CPB Report explores the proposed
reforms of capital taxation. The present paper investigates
the labor-market implications of the proposed changes in
income taxes and the shift from direct towards indirect
taxes. We adopt CPB’s applied general equilibrium model,
called MIMIC. This model is specifically designed for ana-
lyzing tax policies in the Netherlands by focusing on ade-
quately describing wage formation, labor demand and
supply, and the institutional details of the Dutch tax sys-
For more information, contact Ruud de Mooij (tel: 031-70-3383364;
radm@cpb-nl) Johan Graafland (tel: 031-70-3383468; e-mail:jjg@cpb.nl)
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rather easily in terms of rational micro-economic behav-
ior (for a description of the model, see Gelauff and
Graafland (1994); Graafland and De Mooij (1998); or
Bovenberg, Graafland and De Mooij (1998)).
This paper is organized as follows. After giving a short
overview of the current Dutch tax system, we discuss
the implications of three budgetary neutral tax reforms
included in the government white paper. Subsequently,
we elaborate on some of the tax-reform proposals in the
white paper that reduce the tax burden.
The current Dutch tax system
The statutory income tax system in the Netherlands in
1998 is pictured in figure 1. It consists of a general tax
allowance of about DFL 8.600 and three tax brackets.
The tax rate in the first bracket in 1998 is 36.35%. The
rate in the second bracket is 50% and has to be paid on
incomes above DFL 55.000. The marginal rate in the third
tax bracket is 60% and is paid on incomes above DFL
115.000. For workers, a special earned-income tax deduc-
tion amounts to 12% of current labor income with a max-
imum of around DFL 3.100. This maximum is reached at
an annual income of DFL 26.000. Furthermore, there are
a number of tax allowances such as a tax deduction for
interest payments on (mortage) loans, pension premiums,
and a number other special expenditure categories. VAT
in the Netherlands consists of a low rate on necessary
goods (6% rate) and a high rate on other goods (171/2%). 
Three revenue-neutral tax reforms
The government proposals for tax-reform include three
types of revenue-neutral shifts in the tax burden. The first
amounts to abolishing some specific tax deductions to
reduce income tax rates. The second experiment involves
a shift in the tax burden from direct towards indirect taxes.
The final tax shift eliminates the general tax allowance
accompanied by a reduction in income tax rates. The long-
run effects of these three experiments on the labor mar-
ket according to MIMIC are presented in the first three
columns of table 1.
Abolishing tax deductions and reducing tax rates
The first element of the tax-reform proposal involves a
Figure 1 The current Dutch income tax sys-
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MIMIC is an applied general equilibrium model for the
Netherlands that is designed to analyze the longrun
economic impact of tax policies. It contains five sub-
models that are linked through markets. The submodels
include:
1. Model of the firm
Firm behavior in six production sectors is derived from
profit maximization on a market characterized by
monopolistic competition. This submodel determines
the demand for three types of labor, namely unskilled,
low-skilled and high-skilled labor.
2. Household model
MIMIC contains 40 types of households that differ in
skill level, composition and labor-market status. This
submodel derives labor supply of each household by
maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint and
a time constraint.
3. Wage formation
The labor market is characterized by equilibrium unem-
ployment due to imperfections. In particular, a right-
to-manage model describes the process of wage for-
mation. The average tax burden and the replacement
rate have a positive impact on the wage outcome,
whereas the marginal tax and labor supply reduce
wages. The producer wage depends on not only this
contractual wage, but also on search costs related to
the matching proces.
4. Matching model
The matching model describes the contacts between
vacancies and unemployment for each skill type. Part
of these contacts result in a mismatch because a min-
imum wage and a reservation wage distort the match-
ing proces. The vacancy/matching-ratio raises the pro-
ducer wage through its effect on search costs.
5. Government sector
Government behavior is largely exogenous. This sub-
model describes Dutch labor-market institutions, the
statutory tax and premium system, and the system of
social insurances.
Apart from these main building blocks, MIMIC con-
tains an informal sector that consists of household
production and a black labor market. Furthermore,
endogenous training decisions that contribute to human
capital formation and a market for childcare are
included.
tem (see box 1). Indeed, MIMIC combines a rich theoret-
ical framework based on modern economic theories, a
firm empirical foundation, and an elaborate description
of the Dutch tax system. The theoretical foundation of the
model implies that one can interpret the model results
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broadening of the tax base by reducing a number of tax
deductions such as interest payments on short-term loans
Table 1 Long-run effects of three revenue-
neutral tax reforms, according to MIMIC
(1) (2) (3)
relative changes in %
Producer – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.8
Production 0.3 0.1 0.4
Employment 0.3 0.1 0.5
Participation rate 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.5
Labor supply (hours) 0.2 0.0 0.5
Black labor supply – 0.4 0.1 – 0.5
Human capital (index) 0.0 0.0 0.0
absolute changes in %
Unemployment rate 0.0 0.0 0.1
Average replacement ratio – 0.2 0.2 – 0.3
Average tax burdena – 0.2 0.2 – 0.3
Marginal tax burdena – 0.7 – 0.9 – 1.2
Public consumptionb 0.0 0.0 0.0
a Weighted average of micro burdens on workers, excluding 
indirect taxes
b Closure rule, in terms of GDP
Simulations:
(1) Abolishing a set of specific tax deductions and cutting income
fax rates
(2) A shift from direct to indirect taxes
(3) Abolishing the general tax deduction and cutting income tax
rates
and some particular annuity and saving facilities. The most
important tax allowances, however, such as the tax deduc-
tions for interest payments on mortage loans, pension
premiums and worker allowances, are not affected.
Therefore, the broadening of the tax base yields revenues
of only 0.35% of GDP. These revenues are used to reduce
the rates in the first three tax brackets by, respectively,
0.65%-point, 1.6%-point and 1.8%-point. For most income
categories, this revenue-recycling implies that the oper-
ation exerts, on average, no impact on after-tax real incomes
(although there may be substantial effects in particular
individual cases).
The first column of Table 1 reveals that this part of the
reform reduces the marginal tax burden as perceived by
households. The lower marginal rates stimulate labor sup-
ply through the substitution effect. Through the process of
wage formation, this additional labor supply moderates
wage claims by unions so that employment slightly expands.
Unemployment does not change much, however.1
A shift from direct to indirect taxes
The second revenue-neutral element in the tax-reform
proposals involves replacing direct by indirect taxes. In
particular, the VAT rate is increased from 171/2% to 19%.
Furthermore, energy taxes and taxes on other pollutants
are raised. The additional revenues from these indirect
taxes amount to 1% of GDP. In order to ensure that most
households do not experience losses in real disposable
incomes, these revenues are recycled to the private sec-
tor through a reduction in the rate of the first tax bracket
of 1.6%-point and an increase in the basic tax deduction
of DFL 800. The second column of Table 1 shows that this
component of the proposed tax reform hardly affects
employment and unemployment. The reason is that house-
holds are not encouraged to supply more labor since
the incidence of the lower direct taxes bears on similar
incomes as the incidence of the higher indirect taxes.
Indeed, the shift from direct to indirect taxes is designed
so as to keep the income distribution among the various
income categories broadly unaffected. The restrictions of
budgetary and income neutrality imply that the conse-
quences for the labor market are negligible. 
Abolishing the basic tax allowance
A third revenue-neutral tax shift included in the white
paper involves abolishing the basic tax allowance.
Furthermore, the borders of the second and third brack-
ets are reduced to DFL 26.500 and DFL 53.000, respec-
tively. These changes allow the government to substan-
tially reduce the income tax rates in the three tax brack-
ets to, respectively 20,35%; 35% and 50%. In terms of
figure 1, this proposal implies that different borders of the
tax brackets move to the left while marginal tax rates drop
(see the dashed lines in figure 1). Accordingly, individu-
als with annual incomes below the current basic tax
allowance are faced with a higher marginal tax rate, while
the marginal tax rate for households with somewhat higher
incomes falls. Furthermore, whereas the marginal tax rate
for middle incomes remains broadly unaffected, the lower
tax rate in the third bracket reduces the marginal tax rate
for high-income households.2 The effects on the labor
market are presented in the third column of  Table 1. 
Labor supply in hours rises through two main chan-
nels. First, the lower marginal tax rate on high incomes
stimulates labor supply through the substitution effect.
Second, whereas the higher marginal tax burden on low
incomes discourages participation in very small part-time
jobs (i.e. the participation rate falls), the lower marginal
tax rate in the first bracket stimulates part-time workers
to increase their hours worked. On balance, labor sup-
ply in hours rises by 0.5%. Unemployment rises margin-
ally because the value of existing in-work benefits is
reduced. Indeed, for low-income groups the earned-income
tax allowance is no longer deducted at a 36.35% rate,
but only at the 20.35% rate. This raises the replacement
rate for low-income groups, thereby exerting upward wage
pressure through a rise in the outside option for employ-
ees in the wage negotiations. Furthermore, the higher
replacement rate exacerbates the mismatch on the labor
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market by raising the reservation wage of the unemployed
who become more reluctant to accept a job offer.
Cutting the tax burden
The results from Table 1 suggest that tax shifting without
reducing the overall tax burden has only minor implications
for the labor market. The reason is that the three revenue-
neutral tax-reform proposals do not allow for changes in
the income distribution among various income groups.
Such diverging income effects may be acceptable, however,
if the government is able to reduce the overall tax burden.
Indeed, this would allow the government to protect the
incomes of the unemployed and those outside the labor
market and yet reducing the tax burden on workers. The
policy document discusses 18 different ways to reduce
the overall tax burden and explores which of these ways
is most effective in reducing the unemployment rate and
raising labor supply. Below, we highlight the most impor-
tant instruments that are incorporated in these 
18 variants. In each experiment, the ex-ante (i.e. before
behavioral responses have been taken into account) reduc-
tion in tax revenues is 0.35% of GDP (2.5 billion guilders).
A cut in public consumption is necessary to balance the
government budget ex post, i.e. after the effects of the behav-
ioral responses on the public budget have been taken into
account. Hence, the required cut in public consumption
reflects the impact of behavioral responses on the public
budget. In particular, if the reduction in public consumption
is less than the ex-ante cut in revenues of 0.35% of GDP,
behavioral responses help to mitigate the budgetary costs.
Cutting marginal tax rates
The first column of Table 2 contains the effects of a cut in
all three tax brackets of the Dutch personal income tax. In
particular, the tax rate in each bracket is cut by 0.7%-point.
This tax cut reduces both marginal and average tax rates.
Since substitution effects from leisure to consumption
dominate income effects, the reduction in the marginal
tax rates boosts aggregate labor supply (in hours). This
effect is reinforced by the decline in the supply of black
labor because lower marginal income taxes make formal
labor supply more attractive compared to informal labor.
The income tax cut reduces equilibrium unemployment
for two main reasons. First, the drop in the average tax
burden moderates contractual wages. Second, the replace-
ment rate falls. Indeed, workers tend to benefit more from
lower marginal rates of personal income tax than trans-
fer recipients do because the incomes of workers tend
to exceed those of transfer recipients. 
Overall, we find that reducing marginal tax rates raises
aggregate employment through the channels of both lower
unemployment and higher labor supply.
Flat earned income tax credit
The second column of Table 2 contains the impact of a flat
EITC of 350 guilders per year (corresponding to about
0.7% of the median gross wage). This non-refundable EITC
reduces the marginal tax rate on small part-time jobs so
that partners find it more attractive to enter the labor force.
Accordingly, the participation rate (i.e. labor supply in per-
sons) increases. The income effect reduces labor supply
of other groups, thereby offsetting higher labor supply of
partners. On balance, aggregate labor supply (in hours)
rises slightly.
Unemployment declines substantially. The reason is
that the EITC accrues only to those in work and hence
reduces the replacement rate. The lower replacement rate
enhances job matching by reducing the reservation wage.
Moreover, it moderates contractual wages. This wage mod-
eration reduces the incomes from transfers recipients
because social benefits are linked to gross wages.
A targeted EITC based on annual labor incomes3
The third column of Table 2 explores the impact of an EITC
that focuses on raising the reward to low-skilled work. The
EITC analyzed here depends on annual labor income of
an individual.4 It amounts to 4 % of annual labor income
of the individual in a phase-in range up to the statutory
minimum wage (DFL 30.000) and stays at DFL 850 in a flat
Table 2 Long-run effects of four types of tax
cuts according to MIMIC.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
relative changes in %
Wage – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.7
Production 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.6
Employment 0.4 0.6 0.5 0,9
- unskilleda 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.7
Participation rate 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.1
Labor supply (hours) 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 0.0
Black labor supply – 0.3 0.1 0.6 1.4
Human capital (index) 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2
absolute changes in %
Unemployment rate – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.6
- unskilleda – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.2
Average replacement 
ratio – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.9
Average tax burdenb – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 0.6
Marginal tax burdenb – 0.6 – 0.2 0.8 1.2
Public consumptionc – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1
a Unskilled workers with an income up to 120% of the minimun
wage
b Marginal tax on hourly wage as a weighted average of micro
burdens on workers
c Closure rule, in terms of GDP. The ex-ante reduction in tax reven-
ues if normalized at 0.35% of GDP
Simulations:
(1) Lower marginal tax rates in all tree brackets
(2) Introduction of a flat earned-income tax credit
(3) Introduction of a targeted earned-income tax credit, based on
annual incomes
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range up to incomes of about DFL 36.000 (120% of the
minimum wage), see figure 2. Subsequently, the EITC is
phased out linearly between annual labor incomes of DFL
36.000 and DFL 54.000 (i.e. 180 % of the minimum wage).
The EITC reduces the marginal tax burden on small
part-time jobs, thereby encouraging partners to join the
labor force. Accordingly, the participation rate increases.
Moreover, partners raise their labor supply (in hours)
because many partners fall in the phase-in range of the
EITC. Breadwinners and singles, in contrast,  reduce their
labor supply because of a positive income effect and, to
the extent that they fall in the phase-out range, a negative
substitution effect associated with a higher marginal tax
rate. On balance, the reduction in labor supply on account
of the substitution effect in the phase-out range and the
income effect dominates the positive effect on the par-
ticipation rate. Hence, aggregate labor supply (in hours)
drops. The high marginal tax rate in the phase-out range
reduces also the incentives for training. Indeed, the human
capital index falls. Furthermore, the higher marginal tax
rate in the phase-out range boosts informal activities. 
Compared to the fixed EITC, the targeted EITC is more
effective in reducing the replacement rate for low-paid
work. Low-paid workers suffer disproportionally from
unemployment. Accordingly, targeting the EITC is rather
effective in stimulating the unemployed to search more
intensely for a job and to reduce their reservation wage,
thereby facilitating job matching. Furthermore, the lower
replacement rate weakens the bargaining position of
the unions in collective bargaining. Hence, contractual
wages fall. Through all these channels, unemployment
declines. Unemployment for the unskilled falls by 0.9 per-
centage points, which compares to a drop of 0.6 percentage
points with a flat EITC.
The comparison between the flat and targeted EITC
reveals a trade-off between, on the one hand, raising labor
supply and, on the other hand, fighting unemployment.
In particular, by widening the income gap between low
labor incomes and social benefits, a targeted EITC is more
effective in fighting unemployment. However, by reduc-
ing the income gap between low and high labor incomes,
this EITC yields lower labor supply than a flat EITC does.
Figure 2 Structure of the earned income
tax credit
A targeted EITC based on hourly wages
The targeted EITC explored above accrues also to part-
time workers with high hourly wages but low annual
incomes. If the objective is to reduce the number of
unskilled who collect unemployment benefits, the EITC is
not well targeted. Therefore, the white paper focuses on
a targeted EITC that depends on hourly wages rather than
annual incomes. Workers who earn the hourly minimum
wage and hold a full-time job are eligible for the full EITC.
The credit is reduced proportionally for workers who work
less than a full-time job. It gradually drops also with the
level of the hourly wage rate.
By reducing the credit for part-time workers, the EITC
for full-time workers who earn an hourly wage up to 120%
of the statutory minimum wage can be doubled to DFL
1700. The phase out range runs up to an hourly wage of
180% of the minimum wage. The labor-market effects are
presented in the fourth column of Table 2. We find that this
EITC reduces the marginal tax burden only on part-time
jobs with low hourly wages. Hence, the effect on the par-
ticipation rate is smaller than in the previous experiment.
The higher marginal tax rate in the phase-out range applies
only to higher hourly wages and not to higher labor
incomes on account of more hours worked. Accordingly,
labor supply (in hours) drops only on account of the income
effect. Both the effects on participation and labor supply
(in hours) are thus smaller (in absolute value) than in the
previous experiment. Indeed, on balance, the positive
effect on participation rate and the negative labor sup-
ply effect associated with the income effect cancel out.
Consequently, labor supply (in hours) is unaffected.
The marginal tax rate on higher hourly wages in the
phase-out range is higher than in the previous experiment
because the maximum credit is twice as large. This harms
the incentives to accumulate human capital. Hence, com-
pared to an EITC that depends on annual incomes, an EITC
that depends on hourly wages does less harm to the quan-
tity of labor supply but more harm to its quality. Another
drawback of this variant of the EITC is that it relies on addi-
tional information (namely the number of hours worked
in the formal sector) that is vulnerable to fraud. Indeed,
the black economy expands substantially.
This EITC reduces the replacement rate for unskilled
workers more substantially than the other EITCs explored
above. Through skill-specific wage formation, this decline
in the replacement rate for unskilled work reduces gross
unskilled wages, thereby boosting demand for unskilled
labor. Moreover, the lower replacement rate stimulates
search and lowers the reservation wage, thereby facili-
tating the matching process for unskilled labor. Accordingly,
the unemployment rate for the unskilled and the low skilled
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Conclusions 
The recent white paper by the Dutch government on the
future of the Dutch tax system aims at cutting unem-
ployment in general and low-skilled unemployment in
particular, stimulating the quantity and quality of labor
supply and maintaining an equitable income distribution,
including a reasonable income level for those dependent
on social benefits. Simulations with MIMIC reveal trade-
offs between these objectives. Indeed, these objectives
imply different priorities for how tax cuts are structured.
In particular, cutting unemployment primarily requires
widening the gap between labor incomes and transfer
incomes in unemployment. Raising the quantity and qual-
ity of labor supply in the formal economy calls for widen-
ing the income differentials between low formal labor
incomes and high formal labor incomes. Measures aimed
at cutting unemployment and raising employment may
thus conflict with the objective to maintain an equitable
income distribution. 
An effective way to fight economy-wide unemployment
are in-work benefits. These benefits widen the gap between
after-tax income from work and net transfer income,
thereby raising the reward to work compared to relying
on social benefits. This moderates wage costs, reduces
reservation wages, and encourages search of jobseekers.
The wage moderation reduces social benefits because
these benefits are indexed to (gross) wages. 
Targeting in-work benefits on the low skilled is the most
effective way to cut economy-wide unemployment. This
is because the gap between labor income and transfer
income is smallest for low-skilled workers. Hence, widen-
ing this small gap produces the largest pay-off in terms
of reducing unemployment. However, by reducing the
gap between low en high labor incomes through a more
progressive tax system for workers, a targeted EITC reduces
the hours of labor supplied. This trade-off between cut-
ting unemployment and raising labor supply (in hours)
can be mitigated by linking the EITC to hourly wages rather
than annual incomes and by reducing the EITC propor-
tionally for small part-time jobs. Doing so, however, raises
the marginal tax burden on hourly wage increases, thereby
discouraging the accumulation of human capital and stim-
ulating the black economy. Moreover, the lower benefits
to small part-time jobs do not help to raise the labor-force
participation of women. This points to a trade-off between
targeting tax cuts at small part-time jobs of partners or at
full-time jobs of breadwinners and singles earning low
hourly wages.
Tax cuts in the higher tax brackets are most effective in
raising the quantity and quality of formal labor supply (in
hours). Indeed, these policies widen the after-tax income
differentials between low and high labor incomes by reduc-
ing marginal tax rates. However, cuts in higher tax brack-
ets are less effective in reducing unemployment (by widen-
ing the income gap between being in work and collecting
unemployment benefits), raising low-skilled employment,
and stimulating labor supply.
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Notes
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